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Foreign Law in the New York
Surrogate's Court: A View
from the Bench*
HON. S. SAMUEL DIFALCO**
Almost five years ago, New York revised its entire statute regulating
procedure in the Surrogate's Courts of the State.' At the same time, a
revision was made of the laws dealing with the substantive matters finding
everyday application in these courts.2 However, no detailed consideration
was or could have been given to the laws of sister states or foreign coun-
tries in this area. It was not within the power of the New York legislators
nor the Commission on Estates3 to change or affect such foreign laws.
Nevertheless, the Commission did consider the laws of many jurisdictions
in the reports underlying its recommendations. This was essential because
foreign law is applicable in so many estate matters, from those involving
the most basic elements of authentication of a document to entitle it to
*The following article is adapted from an address by the Honorable S. Samuel Di-
Falco delivered before the American Foreign Law Association on May 11, 1972.
**B.C.S. New York University 1929; LL. New York University 1930; admitted to
the Newv York Bar 1930; former Justice, Supreme Court, New York County, and presently
Judge, Surrogate's Court, New York County.
1. SURROoAx's COURT PROCEDURE Aar (McKinney 1967) [hereinafter cited SCPA]. See
MEMORANDUM OF THE COMMISSION ON LAW OF EsTATEs ON THE SURROGATE'S COURT PRO-
CEDURE AcT, SCPA at xli (McKinney 1967).
2. ESTATES, POWERS AND TRUSTS LAW (McKinney 1967) [hereinafter cited EPTL]. See
MEMORANDUM OF THE COMMISSION ON LAW OF ESTATEs ON Tim ESTATES, PowERs AND
TRUSTS LAw, EPTL at xxxix (McKinney 1967).
3. The Temporary State Commission on the Modernization, Revision and Simplifica-
tion of the Law of Estates [hereinafter cited as Commission on Estates] was created on
April 22, 1961 to "... make a comprehensive study of the relevant provisions of the
real property law, the personal property law, the decedent estate law, the surrogate's
court act and such other statutes as the commission may deem advisable for the pur-
pose of correcting any defects that may appear in the laws relating to estates and
their administration, the descent and distribution of property, and the practice and
procedure relating thereto, and for the purpose of modernizing, simplifying and im-
proving such law." Law of April 22, 1961, ch. 731, [1961] LaWs of New York 2063.
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admission into evidence, to cases in which the foreign law may override
the laws of the State of New York.
The revisions of the New York laws also amply recognized foreign
national law.4 For example, New York has its own established method for
the administration of estates in which a person is appointed as fiduciary,
whether he be an executor or an administrator. However, in foreign
lands, the office of a fiduciary is oftentimes unknown. The property of a
decedent goes directly to his heirs, subject to the obligations which the
decedent incurred during his lifetime.5 Article 16 of the Surrogate's Court
Procedure Act recognizes these diverse foreign methods of estate ad-
ministration. It allows the person entitled to receive the property of the
decedent at his foreign domicile to designate the ancillary fiduciary in
New York.6
The legislative declaration of purpose set forth in Section 1601 of the
Act further shows cognizance of foreign laws. It states:
It is the intent and purpose of this article that ancillary administration
shall be granted in this state only when there is an actual administration in
the domiciliary jurisdiction. If the law of such jurisdiction does not provide
for the appointment of a fiduciary but vests the property of a decedent in a
person or persons subject to the obligation to pay the decedent's debts and
expenses and the legacies bequeathed in his will or the distributive shares
provided by law, such a person shall be recognized as the person acting therein
to administer the decedent's estate in accordance with the law thereof, but
only if such person has complied with all the requirements of such jurisdic-
tion to entitle him to receive the property of the decedent and is acting or
will act there to administer the estate.
JUDICIAL CONTROL OVER FOREIGN HEIRS
Judicial decisions in New York have similarly given substantial con-
sideration to matters of transnational concern, including but not limited
to foreign laws. In all courts, the course of judicial decision frequently
mirrors the course of the then current history.7 The courts strive to make
their decisions relevant to the needs of the world around them. It has
been my experience, gained from a judicial career of over a quarter cen-
4. See FIr REPORT OF THE TEMPORARY STATE COMMISSION ON THE LAw OF ESTATES,
Leg. Doc. No. 19 (1966).
5. See R. B. SCMESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAw 23 (3rd ed. 1970) and authorities there
cited.
6. SCPA § 1601 (McKinney 1967).
7. See, e.g., LON L. FULLER, ANATOMY OF THE LAw (1968); JAMES BRYCE, STUDIES IN
HISTORY AND JURISPRUDENCE (1901); CHARLES WARREN, TuE SUPRE COURT IN UNITED
STATES HISTORY (1922); and HOLMES, Tnr COMMON LAW (1881).
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tury, that the members of the judiciary meet the needs of their constitu-
ency-the intelligent voice of the people and the members of the bar.
Some will recall the genesis of the present Section 2218 of the Surro-
gate's Court Procedure Act.8 When the legislation was first enacted in
1939,9 war clouds hovered over Europe and the chilling stories of the fate
of millions of persons of the Jewish faith and others made all of us
shudder. In brief, it granted discretion to the court to withhold funds
of a foreign beneficiary where the court was in doubt whether such bene-
ficiary would receive the use, benefit and control of the legacy or where
the government of the state of which the beneficiary was a resident would
confiscate it in whole or in part.
Refusal to permit the transmission of the funds to proscribed countries
was not only an economic warfare measure to deprive the enemy of funds
to finance its war machine, but at the same time afforded a haven for
these sequestered funds ultimately to reach the deserving beneficiaries or
their surviving kin when more stable international conditions returned.
Following the defeat of the Nazis, the cold war began and the Iron
Curtain of the communist bloc descended, making it once again impera-
tive to continue the beneficent purposes of this legislation. The Surro-
gate's Courts, immune to the political and other pressures which could
be used against individuals to require them to send moneys abroad, could
take both an objective and overall humane approach to the problem.
While the policy of the New York Courts as regards Section 2218 and
its predecessors has at times been the subject of critidsm,10 my colleagues
8. Originally enacted as § 269 of the former Surrogate's Court Act and later renum-
bered as § 269-a, the present § 2218 of the SCPA (McKinney Supp. 1971-72) provides
for the deposit in court for the benefit of a legatee, distributee or beneficiary:
2. Where it shall appear that a beneficiary would not have the benefit or use
or control of the money or other property due him or where other special
circumstances make it desirable that such payment be paid into court for
the benefit of the beneficiary or the person or persons who may thereafter
appear entitled thereto. The money or property so paid into court shall
be paid out only upon order of the court or pursuant to the order or
judgement of a court of competent jurisdiction.
3. In any such proceeding where it is uncertain that an alien beneficiary or
fiduciary not residing within the United States, the District of Columbia,
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico or a territory or possession of the
United States would have the benefit or use or control of the money or
property due him the burden of proving that the alien beneficiary will
receive the benefit or use or control of the money or property due him
shall be upon him or the person claiming from, through or under him.
9. Law of April 24, 1939, ch. 343, [1939] Laws of New York 791.
10. See, e.g., The Court of Appeals, 1959 Term, 10 BUFFALO L. Rlv. 173 (1960-61).
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and I believe that an overall view will confirm the validity and wisdom
of our position over the years. One cannot forget that because of the
adamant position of my eminent predecessor, Surrogate Foley, the Soviets
changed their inheritance laws so as to facilitate inheritance of foreign
assets by Soviet nationals."' In the same way, this judicial position of im-
pounding funds led to the creation of state enterprises in the Soviet bloc
countries which established stores where hard-to-obtain consumer items
were purchasable only with hard foreign currencies and recipients
thereby received somewhat more benefit than the common currency of
the nation.12 Today with the thaw in the cold war, the need to withhold
funds has been sharply reduced. The Surrogate's Courts now transmit
funds to the countries of the European communist bloc with very limited
restrictions. 13
In 1968, a majority of the United Supreme Court in Zschernig v.
Miller 4 declared that an Oregon statute,15 which in addition to the use,
benefit and control features found in the New York statute, also con-
tained reciprocity and escheat provisions, constituted an impermissible
interference with foreign affairs. When the constitutionality of our statute
was challenged in our Court of Appeals a few months later in Matter of
Leikind,16 Judge Breitel for the majority found no constitutional in-
firmity and distinguished Zschernig v. Miller on the ground that our
statute contained no provisions for reciprocity or escheat. 17 Accordingly,
Section 2218 still possesses constitutional vitality.
11. See, e.g., In re Alexandroff's Estate, 61 N.Y.S.2d 866 (Sur. Ct., N.Y. Co., 1945,
Foley, S.). Furthermore, goods passing to Soviet heirs by inheritance abroad are exempt
from customs duty U.S.S.R. 1962 GRAzH. KOD. (Civil Code) Art. 57 (1962).
12. As for example, the Tuzex Foreign Trade Corporation in Prague, Czechoslovakia.
13. Recent cases exemplifying the very limited restrictions on transmittal of funds
to Soviet bloc countries include: Matter of Becher, 61 Misc.2d 46, 304 N.Y.S.2d 628
(Sur. Ct., N.Y. Co., 1969) (East German beneficiary); Matter of Kina, 29 App. Dlv.2d 563,
286 N.Y.S.2d 773 (2d Dep't 1967), afJd, 23 N.Y.2d 720, 244 N.E2.d 57, 296 N.Y.S.2d
366 (1967) (Polish beneficiary); Matter of Padworski, 53 Misc.2d 1043, 281 N.Y.S.2d 276
(Sur. Ct., Duchess Co., 1967) (Russian beneficiary).
14. 389 U.S. 429, 88 S. Ct. 664, 19 L. Ed. 2d 683 (1968).
15. ORE. Rrv. STAT. § 111.070 (1957).
16. 22 N.Y.2d 346, 239 N.E.2d 550, 292 N.Y.S.2d 681 (1968).
17. 22 N.Y.2d 346, 351, 239 N.E.2d 550, 552, 292 N.Y.S.2d 681, 685. Judge Breitel,
speaking for the majority in Leikind, stated:
Moreover the majority opinion in the Zschernig case ... arguably accepted
'benefit, use or control' provisions as valid, provided State courts did no more
than 'routinely read' foreign laws and provided there was no palpable inter-
ference with foreign relations in their application. Thus, if the courts of this
State, in applying the 'benefit, use or control' requirements, simply determine,
without animadversions, whether or not a foreign country, by statute or other-
uise, prevents its residents from actually sharing in the estates of New York
[Vol. 6:45
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Related to the concern of the Surrogate's Courts with the receipt of
funds by residents of Nazi and Communist countries is the manner in
which these Courts treated applications to declare holocaust victims dead,
and determined the identity of their distributees and other persons en-
titled to funds withheld during the period of hostilities. My distinguished
predecessors, Surrogates Delehanty and Collins, fashioned proceduress
to determine if such victims were dead which were both pragmatic and
understanding, They realized that in the face of the exceptional circum-
stances presented, the strict application of the usual common law prin-
ciples' 9 regarding proof of death would often result in hardship and
injustice.
NONDOMICILIARY ESTATES
Another question frequently presented to the Surrogates is the question
whether to exercise original jurisdiction over the estate of a nondomi-
ciliary. Generally, original probate jurisdiction is declined only where
the will offered for probate has already been probated or established, or
denied probate in the testator's domicile.
2 0
The recent decision in Matter of Heller-Baghero,21 which unanimously
affirmed my initial determination 22 regarding jurisdiction is instructive.
In that case, a 1962 will of the decedent had been established in the
Austrian court. Thereafter, I entertained a proceeding for the probate
decedents, the statute would not be unconstitutional under the explicit ra-
tionale of the Zschernig case.
22 N.Y.2d 346, 351-52, 239 N.E.2d 550, 553, 292 N.Y.S.2d 681, 685 (footnotes omitted).
18. Where there was no evidence to the contrary, official Declarations of Death issued
by foreign governments were accepted as sufficient evidence of death. Matter of Elias,
189 Misc. 279, 70 N.Y.S.2d 856 (Sur. Ct., N.Y. Co., 1947, Delehanty, S.); Matter of
Magre, 189 Misc. 246, 73 N.Y.S.2d 467 (Sur. Ct., N.Y. Co., 1947, Collins, S.); Levy &-
Levy, Proving the Death of a Non-resident Alien, 24 CONN. B.J. 324 (1950).
The standards in European statutes as to the presumption of death were also ap-
plied in situations where the missing person was a European domiciliary. Matter of
Gauds, 189 Misc. 861, 73 N.Y.S.2d 779 (Sur. Ct., N.Y. Co., 1945, Delehanty, S.); Matter
of Jansons, 189 Misc. 554, 73 N.Y.S.2d 685 (Sur. Ct., N.Y. Co., 1947, Collins, S.), Szabad
& Blum, Proving Death of Victims of Nazi Oppression, 24 N.Y.U.L.Q. REV. 577 (1949).
19. Under common law, death is presumed at the close of a continuous absence
abroad for a period of seven years, during which time nothing is heard from the
person. The burden of proof is on the person claiming a right for which proof of
death is essential. See 22 Am. Jt. 2d Death § 304.
20. See SCPA § 201 (McKinney 1967) and Practice Commentary there following,
21. 26 N.Y.2d 337, 258 N.E.2d 717, 310 N.Y.S.2d 313 (1970).
22. Matter of Heller-Baghero (Sur. Ct., N.Y. Co., 1969) 161 N.Y.L.J., March 4, 1969,
at S4, col. 5, af?'d, 32 App. Div.2d 328, 302 N.Y.S.2d 235 (1st Dep't 1969), aff'd, 26
N.Y.2d 337, 258 N.E.2d 717, 310 N.Y.S.2d 313 (1970).
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of a later 1964 will which had been executed in New York, revoking prior
wills, and naming a New York resident as executor. The will also recited
that the testator's residence was in New York, a comparatively unim-
portant factor certainly not determinative of the issue of domicile. Addi-
tionally, and most important-as in many of these cases-substantial
assets (90%) were located within New York County.
The Court of Appeals determined 2a that the Surrogate had discretion
to entertain jurisdiction.24 Nevertheless, the opinion of our highest court
makes the following pointed observation: 25
If, however, the Surrogate has power to entertain an original probate pro-
ceeding as a matter of discretion, the particular facts of this case may justify
such action. This is not to say that the interests of comity are insubstantial,
or that probate of the 1964 will in New York, in opposition to the 1962 will
probated in Austria, will not result in inconsistent awards to the extent that
each jurisdiction has physical power over the property within its boundaries.
Interests of orderliness, and of unitary administration, generally require that
disposition of the property in the same estate, be uniform.
Matter of Utassi,26 presented an unusual fact situation revolving about
two sisters, and posed the question of whether property could devolve
upon a state as legal heir in the absence of other legal heirs. The first
sister died testate in New York in 1935 leaving her entire estate to her
surviving sister, a resident of Lucerne, Switzerland. The New York ad-
ministrator c.t.a. had not completed the administration of the estate when
the second sister died intestate in Lucerne in 1944. The second sister left
no heirs.27 She possessed property in Switzerland, part of which consisted
of shares in American corporations. In addition, she had succeeded to
the assets in her predeceased sister's estate which still remained physically
in New York.
23. 26 N.Y.2d 337, 345, 258 N.E.2d 717, 722, 310 N.Y.S.2d 313, 319-20.
24. The court noted, 22 N.Y.2d 337, 344, 258 N.E2.d 717, 721, 310 N.Y.S. 313, 318-19,
that:
[Ihe only [real] issue is of the validity of the 1962 and 1964 wills, and not
whether the law of New York or Austria governs the intrinsic validity, or ef-
fect, of the will or devolution of the property when not disposed by will. The
construction of the wills and questions of rights of election or forced heirship
covering personalty would be governed by Austrian law, if, as alleged, the de-
ceased was an Austrian domiciliary (EPTL 3-5.1, subd. [b], par. [2]; see Matter
of Clark, 21 N.Y.2d 478, 483, 349).
25. 26 N.Y.2d 337, 344, 258 N.E.2d 717, 721, 310 N.Y.S.2d 313, 318-19.
26. Matter of Utassi, 29 Misc.2d 237, 217 N.Y.S.2d 389 (Sur. Ct., N.Y. Co., 1961).
aff'd, 20 App. Div.2d 232, 246 N.Y.S.2d 478 (1st Dep't 1964), aff'd, 15 N.Y.2d 436, 209
N.E.2d 65, 261 N.Y.S.2d 4 (1965).
27. Under Swiss law, if there exist no other heirs, the canton (and/or a municipality




The Attorney General of New York relied upon Matter of Mensche-
freund28 which held that where there are no heirs under the law of the
situs-New York- or of the domicile-California-and the law of the domi-
cile calls for an escheat, the personalty in New York will escheat to the
State of New York as a matter of public policy. He argued before me
that the language of a foreign statute should not disguise the fact that
the taking by the foreign government was an escheat despite the fact that
the foreign government declared itself an heir and was taking the prop-
erty by inheritance rather than by sovereign right.
I overruled this contention in an opinion29 which was adopted by the
majority of the Appellate Division. In the unanimous opinion of affir-
mance in the Court of Appeals, Judge Bergan emphasized as the dis-
tinguishing factor from Menschefreund the creation under Swiss Law of
an inheritance in favor of a public body. He said:3 0
Nothing in our statutory law relating to abandoned property, which func-
tionally is a statutory mechanism to hold assets found in this state for the
benefit of a future lawful claimant, or in any New York public or legal policy,
should lead us to discredit the law of succession of Switzerland, where Etelka
[the surviving sister] was domiciled and died.
Our view of the Swiss law ought not to be parochial. On the contrary we
should accord the Swiss statute of succession the recognition which comity
between enlightened governments requires.
In sum, under Swiss law, and that of other civil law countries31 the
right of the state to take is not a confiscatory right predicated upon
escheat, but a right of inheritance. Where the right is one of escheat, for
example, under California law or Czechoslovakian law,32 New York State
will retain the assets under the Abandoned Property Law.p Utassi thus
put to rest the question which I had answered in Matter of Turton,84 but
which had been left open by the Court of Appeals when it decided
the case.33 It is a dear illustration of true international comity in which
28. 283 App. Div. 463, 128 N.Y.S.2d 788 (Ist Dep't 1954), aff'd, 8 N.Y.2d 1093, 170
N.E.2d 902, 208 N.Y.S.2d 453 (1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 842 (1961).
29. Supra note 26.
30. 15 N.Y.2d 436, 442, 209 N.E.2d 65, 67, 261 N.Y.S.2d 4, 78.
31. E.g., Federal Republic of Germany, BGB § 1936; Italy, C. Civ. § 586.
32. Under California law whenever the title to any property fails for want of heirs
or next of kin, it reverts to the people. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 182 (West 1966). For a
discussion of Czech law regarding escheat see Matter of Matous, 53 Misc.2d 255, 258, 278
N.Y.S.2d 70, 73 (Sur. Ct., Richmond Co., 1967).
33. N.Y. ABANDONED PROPERTY LAW (McKinney 1944).
34. Matter of Turton, 20 Misc.2d 569, 192 N.Y.S.2d 254 (Sur. Ct., N.Y. Co., 1959),
aff'd, 9 App. Div.2d 759, 193 N.Y.S.2d 1001 (1st Dep't 1959), rev'd, 8 N.Y.2d 311, 170
N.E.2d 190, 206 N.Y.S.2d 761 (1960).
35. Matter of Turton, 8 N.Y.2d 311, 170 N.E.2d 190, 206 N.Y.S.2d 761 (1960).
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our courts will give extra-territorial effect to foreign law, even when it
involves the devolution of property physically located here.
While involving only a sister-state dispute between the community
property State of Louisiana and the State of New York, Matter of Crich-
ton,30 has reverberations in the field of international law as well. In
Wyatt v. Fulrath,37 the Court of Appeals permitted Spanish non-domi-
ciliaries under a community property regime to make dispositions under
New York law which would have been violative of the law of Spain.
In Crichton, the testator, a New York domiciliary, made no provision
for his surviving spouse. The bulk of his estate consisted of intangible
personal property having a situs in Louisiana. The executrix initiated
an ancillary proceeding in Louisiana for approval of her inventory and
computation of Louisiana inheritance taxes. The wife made a claim to
part of the Louisiana assets by reason of that State's community property
laws. Over objection, the Louisiana Court issued an injunction restrain-
ing the executrix from disposing of the Louisiana property. While this
Louisiana proceeding was pending, the executrix filed an intermediate
account in New York in which she allowed the claim of the widow on
the basis of the Louisiana community property laws. A child of a prior
marriage objected to the allowance of the claim on the ground that the
Louisiana laws were inapplicable. The objection was unanimously sus-
tained in all the courts.38 It was held that the choice-of-law problem
should be resolved by determining which jurisdiction had the paramount
interest in the application of its law. Here, it was felt that all significant
contacts were with New York and its law was determinative.
The conflict was thus resolved by applying the New York marital-
domicile doctrine3 9 rather than the Louisiana-situs rule4O as to personal
36. 49 Misc. 2d 405, 267 N.Y.S.2d 706 (Sur. Ct., Westchester Co., 1966), afJ'd, 26 App.
Div. 2d 639, 272 N.Y.S.2d 987 (2d Dep't 1966), aff'd, 20 N.Y.2d 124, 228 N.E.2d 799, 281
N.Y.S.2d 811 (1967).
37. 16 N.Y.2d 169, 211 N.E.2d 637, 264 N.Y.S.2d 233 (1965).
38. Supra note 35.
39. The New York doctrine of marital domicile holds that a woman upon marriage
takes the domicile of her husband by operation of law. In re Daggett's Will, 255 N.Y.
243, 174 N.E. 641 (1931). Matrimonial domicile is the domicile of the husband, from
the moment of marriage until the matrimonial unit is dissolved. Matter of Crichton,
supra note 35.
40. The rule is found in La. Code of 1870 and is quoted by Judge Keating, 20 N.Y.2d
124, 131 n.5, 228 N.E.2d 799, 804 n.5, 281 NY.S.2d 811, 817 n.5:
All property acquired in this State by non-resident married persons, whether
the title thereto be in the name of either the husband or wife, or in their
Joint names, shall be subject to the same provisions of law which regulate
e community acquets and gains between citizens of this State.
[Vol. 6:45
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property. While the decision could have been based upon traditional
conflict-of-laws rules in this area,41 the Court of Appeals preferred to
discuss the contacts of both states and held irrelevant those contacts with
Louisiana which had been urged to support the application of Louisiana's
property laws. Judge, now Ambassador, Keating concluded his opinion as
follows:42
In situations such as that present in this case, where the foreign jurisdiction
has no interest in the application of its law, where there was no clear expres-
sion of intent that foreign law govern and where we have the power to apply
our own law and give effect to the policy this State has adopted in regulating
the rights of married persons we should apply our own law.
The overriding importance of the testator's domicile in relation to
public policy is further evidenced by Matter of Clark.43 In Crichton,
decided some six months before Clark, the Court of Appeals observed
that our laws are designed to encourage investment of funds in this State
by permitting a nondomiciliary to designate New York Law as appli-
cable to determine questions of law relating to testamentary dispositions
of personal property located here as well as inter vivos trusts having a
situs in this State.
Bearing in mind this expression of New York public policy, let us look
at the facts in Clark. The testator, a domiciliary of Virginia, died leaving
the bulk of his $23,000,000 estate in securities in a New York bank. He
had made a will in 1962 designating New York law to control the con-
struction, regulation and determination of its provisions. He established
a trust for his widow, a resident of Virginia, satisfying the requirements
of former Section 18 of the Decedent Estate Law.44 Accordingly, the
widow had no right of election if New York law were deemed applicable.
Under applicable Virginia law, the widow had an absolute right to take
outright one-half of his estate. Despite the testator's declared intention
and the ostensible implications derived from prior cases such as Wyatt
and Crichton, the Court of Appeals issued a caveat that a testator may
not unilaterally reduce or impair the spouse's right to a share of his
41. EPTL § 3-5.1 (McKinney 1967) codifies the prior well-established rule that the
law of decedent's last domicile governs the testamentary disposition and intestate dis-
tribution of personal property. Matter of Hyde, 177 Misc. 666, 31 N.Y.S.2d 497 (Sur.
Ct., N.Y. Co., 1941), Matter of Brown, 133 Misc. 457, 233 N.Y.S. 145 (Sur. Ct., Clinton
Co., 1929), Matter of Meyer, 117 Misc. 511, 192 N.Y.S. 717 (Sur. Ct., Queens Co., 1921),
Matter of Utassi, 15 N.Y.2d 436, 209 N.E2d 65, 261 N.Y.S2d 4 (1965).
42. Matter of Crichton, 20 N.Y.2d 124, 137-38, 228 N.E.2d 799, 808, 281 N.Y.S.2d
811, 823 (1967).
43. 21 N.Y.2d 478, 236 N.E.2d 152, 288 N.Y.S.2d 993 (1968).
44. Now EPTL § 5-1.1 (McKinney 1967).
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estate assured her by the law of their domicile.45 Testators, unhappy
with the domiciliary provisions for a surviving spouse, may not defeat
the legitimate expectations of the latter by seeking to invoke New York
law rather than the law of the domicile.
CONCLUSION
From among a legion of cases in the Surrogate's Courts, I have chosen
those just discussed as representative of the interest and importance of
foreign law. Throughout my discussion there has been implicit a recog-
nition of the role of the public policy of New York and the legitimate
demands of comity.
In estates with foreign involvement, these principles must have a basic
play with common law concepts. New York, the center of commercial
activity, often finds estate assets within its boundaries. It has been in a
unique position to evolve enlightened and just settlements of estates
through equitable application of these three principles. This, as I hope I
have demonstrated, has been accomplished.
45. Matter of Clark, 21 N.Y.2d 478, 487, 236 N.E.2d 152, 157, 288 N.Y.S-.d 995,
1000 (1968).
